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Abstract_______________________________________________________________
Was the Civil War (1936-39) originated by staggering inequality and extreme poverty?
How did Franco’s dictatorship (1939-75) affect inequality and poverty? As a first step to
provide an answer, growth and inequality over the long-run are assessed and their impact
on absolute poverty calibrated. The paper concludes that during the last one and a half
centuries economic growth, but also the decline in inequality during the Interwar years and
since the late 1950s, led to a substantial reduction in absolute poverty. Raising inequality
and poverty do not seem to have triggered the Civil War.
JEL classification: N13, N14, N33, N34, I32
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Pons, Joan R. Rosés, Blanca Sánchez-Alonso, James Simpson and participants in Session 116 of the
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Seventy five years have elapsed since the II Republic was proclaimed. Attempts to
introduce institutional and social reforms were accompanied by increasing social turmoil
and political unrest and ended with General Franco’s uprising and the Civil War (1936-39).
Were there economic causes of the War of Spain? If this was the case, should astounding
inequality and extreme poverty be included among them? Was economic progress during
the 1920s, under General Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-29), associated to raising
inequality that eventually contributed to trigger the civil war?
The Civil War was followed by Franco’s long dictatorship (1939-75) that
encompassed two distinctive phases: autarchy and sluggish growth, in the first one;
cautious liberalization and fast economic progress, in the second. Was there an association
between autarchy and inequality and poverty? Was there a trade off between growth and
inequality in Spain’s delayed Golden Age (1960-74)? How was poverty affected by this
economic success? Did restoring democracy help to reduce inequality and absolute poverty
during the II Republic (1931-36) and, again, during the last three decades?
Furthermore, had the institutional modernization that accompanied early modern
economic growth in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century a significant
impact on income distribution and the standard of living?.
There is, hence, an ambitious research agenda in which this paper is just a first step.
My goal here is simply assessing growth and inequality trends and proposing plausible
conjectures of their impact on poverty reduction in the long-run.
The paper is divided into three sections. Against the pessimistic qualitative
assessments of Spain’s economic history pioneers (Nadal 1975, Sánchez-Albornoz 1968,
Tortella 1973) that percolated through international textbooks with lasting effects (see, for
example, O’Rourke and Williamson 1999), Section I shows that modern economic growth
has been far from a failed experience in Spain over the last one and a half centuries. But,
did economic growth have an impact on poverty in the long run? The extent to which
sustained per capita GDP growth impinges on the lower deciles of income distribution
depends on the initial level of development, the degree of income inequality, and how
sensitive poverty is to variations in income and inequality (Bourguignon 2002). Assessing
inequality over time is, hence, a prerequisite to investigate absolute poverty reduction. In3
the absence of direct estimates of income distribution based on microeconomic evidence
prior to 1973, an indirect and macroeconomic approach to appraising inequality is explored
in section II. It turns out that the evolution of income inequality resembles two wide
Kuznets (1955) inverted U with peaks in 1918 and 1953, respectively. Lastly, in section III
an attempt is made at establishing trends in absolute poverty levels by calibrating the
impact of growth and inequality on poverty reduction on the basis of López and Servén’s
(2006) recent empirical research. It turns out that economic growth, together with a decline
in inequality during the Interwar years and since the late 1950s, led to a substantial
reduction in absolute poverty during the last one and a half centuries. Section IV wraps up
and suggests a research agenda. It appears that the Civil War occurred after one and a half
decades of inequality decline and poverty alleviation. Early Franco’s dictatorship offers a
clear link between isolation, sluggish growth, and inequality, while poverty levels remained
high and, conversely, an association between openness, growth acceleration, and falling
inequality that led to a reduction in absolute poverty is observed in the late Francoism.
However, the connection between democracy and inequality and poverty decline is not
unambiguous as their contraction also took place under Primo de Rivera’s and late Franco’s
(1960-75) dictatorships.
Long-run Growth
Since mid nineteenth century modern economic growth has irreversibly proceeded
in Spain
1. The steady increase in the aggregate economic activity, at almost 2.5 percent per
year, represents, over a period of a century and a half, a multiplication coefficient of 40,
while population increased more than two and half times. As a result, product per head by
2000 was 15 times greater than in 1850. Meanwhile,private consumption per head, an
indicator which, the provision of public services and income distribution aside, reflects
welfare level, increased 12 times
2. Private domestic consumption only fell substantially
behind GDP growth in the early twentieth century and up to World War I, and during the
1The next paragraphs draw on Prados de la Escosura (2006a).
2Government consumption grew slightly faster than GDP due to expansion in the last quarter of the twentieth
century as a consequence of setting up the welfare state, regional devolution (the emergence of 17
autonomous regions) and industrial restructuring of obsolete and non-competitive manufacturing grown under
strong protectionism and heavy Government intervention (Comín 1992, 1994, González-Páramo 1992).4
Civil War and World War II (1935-1944). Thus, present consumption was not sacrificed to
investment in order to raise future consumption and, consequently, no parallel with the
experiences of Asian NICs can be drawn (Young 1995, Crafts 2000).(Graph 1).
Three main phases which exhibit marked differences in per capita GDP growth can
be identified in Spain’s long-run performance: 1850-1950 (0.7 %), 1951-1974 (5.4 %) and
1975-2000 (2.6 %) (Table 1)
3. Continuity in economic growth between 1850 and 1950 is at
odds with a widely held interpretation that emphasizes the nineteenth century as a period of
failure and the twentieth century as one of economic success (Tortella 1994), while
confirms previous claims of steady trend growth over 1850-1935 (Cubel and Palafox 1998,
Carreras 1987, 1992).
Long-term continuity is, however, compatible with phases or long swings in which
growth rates differs from the trend growth. Economic policies, access to international
markets and technological change would play a part in the four phases that can be
established during the hundred-year era of steady and moderate growth prior to 1950 (Table
1, Panel B)
4. The first two cover the years between 1850 and 1920 with 1883 as a turning
point, while the third phase covers the twenties and the fourth, the period 1930-1952.
During the first and the third periods, 1850-1883 and 1920-29, output per person grew
above the trend rate for 1850-1950. Openness to ideas and to commodity and factor flows
lie beneath the faster pace of growth. Inflows of capital from abroad made it possible to
break the close connection between investment and savings and contributed to economic
growth (Prados de la Escosura 2006b). In the 1920s Government intervention and
investment in infrastructures, it has been argued, were decisive factors behind this growth
(Velarde 1968) but a significant inflow of foreign capital which allowed the purchase of
capital goods and raw materials making possible economic expnasion cannot be neglected
(Prados de la Escosura 2006b, Tena 1999).
Conversely, from the mid 1880s to 1920 and, again, during 1930-52 (a period
which, in addition to the Great Depression, includes Civil War and autarchy) sluggish
growth is associated to increasing international isolation (Fraile Balbín 1991). This growing
isolationism offers the most plausible explanation for the fact that despite the institutional
3Econometric testing suggests that absolute and per capita GDP series are trend stationary with structural
breaks in level (1936) and in trend (1951 and 1975) (Prados de la Escosura 2006a).5
stability achieved during the Restoration, the rate of growth faded sharply. Increasing tariff
protection and not being part of the gold standard seem to have represented a major
obstacle to Spain’s integration in the international economy
5. Moreover, Spain’s neutrality
during the World Wars did not provide the economy with the stimulating aggregate effects
usually assumed
6. Paradoxically, institutional stability during the Restauración (1874-
1923) that could have favored investment and, hence, growth was not accompanied by a
vigorous economic performance, while the opposite happened during the central decades of
the nineteenth century suggesting that stability does not always go hand in hand with well
defined and enforced property rights (Bueno de Mesquita and Root 2000).
The change in trend which began in 1951 brought a century of moderate progress to
an end and ushered in an exceptional phase of rapid growth which lasted until 1974. The
autarchic system, gradually eased over the ‘50s, underlies the lateness of economic spurt.
The move towards a pro-market attitude with deregulation and the gradual opening up of
the economy which began with the 1959 reforms made it possible to achieve a delayed
Golden Age (Prados de la Escosura and Sanz 1996).
After 1975, despite a deceleration in the pace of growth, Spain did not return to the
old trend established in the 100-year period prior to 1950. The expansion which
accompanied entry into the European Union, after overcoming a decade of crisis and
change, did not represent, in turn, a structural break in Spain’s long term growth (Prados de
la Escosura 2003).
A closer look can be obtained by breaking down Gross Domestic Product per person
(GDP/N) into its components: output per employee (GDP/ L), the employment rate
(L/EAP), the activity rate (EAP/PAP) -that is, the ratio of the economically active
population (EAP) to the population ages 15-64, or potentially active population, (PAP)- and
finally, a demographic variable: the ratio between the potential workforce and the total
population (PAP /N). Thus,
GDP/N = (GDP/ L)*(L/EAP)* (EAP/PAP) * (PAP/N) (I)
4These four phases are established as deviations from the trend over 1850-1950 (Prados de la Escosura 2003).
5Cf. Tena (1999), Palafox (1999) and Pardos (1998) on tariff protection and its effects. See Martín Aceña
(1994, 1999) and Bordo and Rockoff (1996) on the gold standard.
6Cf. Roldán and García Delgado (1973) for the conventional view that emphasizes the impact of the Great
War.6
and in rates of change expressed in lower case letters,
gdp/n = (gdp/ l)+ (l/eap) + (eap/pap) + (pap/n) (II)
Table 1 shows the evolution of product per head and each of its components,
expressed in rates of growth, for all the long swings identified over the last century and a
half.Labor productivity turns out to be the main determinant of per capita GDP growth and
shadows it closely.Capital deepening and, especially, total factor productivity gains played
a vital part in raising labor efficiency (Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 2006b). While
productivity gains overcame per capita GDP growth during 1959-85, from 1986 onwards
productivity change lagged way behind per capita income growth and exhibited an inverse
relationship with employment.
The figures in Table 1 indicate that a demographic gift (a larger share of population
in working age) made a contribution to per capita GDP growth since 1975. It also played a
part in moderating the economic slowdown in the critical moments of World War I and the
1930s and 1940s. On the contrary, a demographic burden had a negative effect on income
per person during the ‘Golden Age’ (1951-1974).
The fall in the activity aggravated the negative consequences on per capita GDP
growth of unemployment that went from 4 to 17.4 percent between 1975 and 1985.
Restrictive industrial rules introduced under Franco, which aimed to offset the prohibition
of independent trade unions by prohibiting lay-offs, constituted a major shortcoming for
employment creation during the 1970s oil shocks. Employment creation played a
distinctive role during the ‘Golden Age’ (1952-74) and, again, after Spain’s admission in
the European Union.
Inequality: An Indirect Look
How much of the sustained growth in GDP per head percolated through to reach the
lower quintiles of income distribution? In the absence of direct estimates of income
distribution for most of the period considered (household budget surveys -Encuesta de
presupuestos familiares- are available since 1964 and have been fully exploited from 19747
onwards), an indirect approach is necessary and I will rely on available macroeconomic
evidence to trace the long-run trends in inequality
7.
Inequality between town and countryside represents a persistent phenomenon in
developing countries. The shift of labor away from agriculture that has usually
accompanied urbanization and productivity growth in agriculture constitutes a means to
reduce it. Productivity increases in agriculture provide, through higher wages, the means to
poverty reduction in the countryside.
In a context of imperfect mobility of factors and persistent differences in marginal
labor productivity between sectors, such as was the historical case of Spain, the transfer of
labor from low productivity agriculture to other sectors with higher levels of productivity,
played a part in increasing the economy’s aggregate productivity. The contribution of
agriculture to total employment and output fell gradually except for the 1940s when it
edged ahead of industry employment. A gradual fall in the agricultural share in the labor
force began in the 1880s, gathered pace in the 1920s and, after the 1940s reversal, the
downturn accelerated through the late twentieth century (Graph 2). Labor productivity in
agriculture experienced a moderate increase between 1850 and 1913 (at 0.5 percent per
annum), its rate went up to 2.3 percent during the years 1913-1929, then, decreased in
absolute terms until 1950 (at –0.4 percent over 1930-52) and recovered at a mild pace
during the fifties (at less than 1 percent per year). From 1959 to the end of the twentieth
century the dramatic increase in output per hour worked (above 6 percent per year) is
linked to the shift of labor away from agriculture, as it was also the case during the Interwar
years (Prados de la Escosura 2006a).
Relative to the economy as a whole, labor productivity in agriculture (Graph 3),
after decreasing up to the early 1890s, remained stable for almost 70 years (except for its
increase during the autarchic 1940s and early 1950s) before dropping sharply from the
1960s to the mid 1980s, to initiate, then, aphase of steady recovery. The stability of relative
agricultural productivity, hardly affected by the sector’s steady reduction in its employment
share, underlines the gradual structural transformation experienced by Spain prior to 1960.
Capital deepeningand the introduction of a new vintage technology explain the dramatic
7 For a discussion of available microdata and its treatment for the case of Spain, cf. Alcaide (1999) and
Goerlich and Mas (2001, 2004).8
fall in relative agricultural productivity during the years leading up to 1975. The destruction
of employment in agriculture over the last quarter of the twentieth century, which fell from
around a quarter to around 5 percent of Spain’s workforce at the beginning of the 21
st
century, lies behind the lively recovery of relative agricultural productivity.
Migration to towns and cities usually represent an improvement in standards of
living both for those who leave and for those who stay in rural areas. A sharp decline in the
(purchasing power parity adjusted) rural-urban wage gap occurred between mid-nineteenth
century and World War I, intensified up to 1920 and tended to stabilized thereafter (Rosés
and Sánchez-Alonso 2004, 2006)
8. The skilled/unskilled wage gap followed a similar
pattern to the rural-urban wage gap, and after falling from mid-nineteenth century to 1920,
tended to stabilize (Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso 2004). This view is disputed by Betrán and
Pons (2004) who find a steady increase in the skilled/unskilled wage ratio from the late
nineteenth century up to 1930.
Spatial inequality has been affected by the joint forces of growth, structural change,
and public policies in Spain. The moderate decline observed for the early twentieth century
was reversed after the Civil War (1936-39) (Prados de la Escosura 1992, Domínguez 2002).
From the mid 1950s to 1980 a sharp reduction in regional inequality took place to stabilize
during the last two decades of the twentieth century (Cuadrado Roura 1999). Technological
catch-up, the generalization of basic education and the spatial redistribution of employment
account for most of the observed reduction of regional disparities (de la Fuente 2002).
How much of the observed increase in GDP per head did accrue to labor? is a most
relevant issue to trace the evolution of inequality. The lack of quantitative historical
evidence from which constructing income distribution measures led Jeffrey Williamson
(2002) to propose an ‘inequality index’ defined as the ratio between GDP per worker and
unskilled wage. The rationale for the index is that while the numerator captures returns to
all factors of production per worked hour, the denominator only encapsulates returns for
raw labor, whose property is far more widespread than that of any other factor (and the only
one that most poor possess in developing countries, as was the case of Spain for most of the
period under consideration). It can be objected, however, that when societies develop and
8Interestingly, Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso (2004) find a more modest role for migration in wage convergence
that previously assumed in the literature (Simpson 1995, Silvestre 2005).9
capital deepening increases the index tends to exaggerate inequality as the percentage of
unskilled workers dwindles within the labor force and, hence, the quantile of income
represented by unskilled workers today becomes a fraction of the same quantile in the past
rendering inconsistent across time comparisons. An alternative possibility is to use, instead,
the returns to labor as a whole, including both skilled and unskilled workers. Thus, the
inequality index will be defined in this case as the ratio of nominal GDP per hour worked to
nominal average wage, that is, the returns to all labor, per hour
9.
Since human capital became a distinctive factor only in late twentieth century Spain
(Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 2006b), inequality indices computed with either unskilled
or average wages should hardly differ prior to the 1950s as returns to unskilled workers,
wage-earners and self-employed (including small farm owners) represented most of labor
compensation in nationalincome. From the late 1950s onwards as skilled labor increased
its share in national income while capital deepening occurred, disparities between the
alternative indices should be expected
10. Graph 4 confronts the proposed inequality index
with Williamson’s index (that employs unskilled labor returns as denominator)
11. As
predicted, no major discrepancy between the two indices is observed up to the mid-1950s.
Henceforth, as physical and human capital deepening took place, a gap between the two
inequality indices steadily opened up during the last two decades of the twentieth century.
But how do these alternative inequality indices compare to conventional measures
of income distribution such as available Gini coefficients? Available Gini estimates for any
given benchmark year show, it is worth stressing, significant discrepancies (Deininger and
Squire 1996, WIDER 2005) and procedures have been suggested to reconcile cross-section
and time-series estimates (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001, Francois and Rojas-Romagosa
2005). Here I will only focus on directly computed Gini on the basis on microdata derived
from household surveys by Goerlich and Mas (2001) from 1974 onwards, plus those
9Using nominal instead of real GDP and wage avoids the use of deflators that may follow different trends as
their composition is rather different.
10 An increase in income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers could be expected in the presence
of capital-skill complementarity in production (Katz and Autor 1999). The proposed new measure aims at
capturing, however, aggregate income inequality, that includes inequality between returns to property of
capital and national resources and those to labour.
11 Data for constructing both inequality indices comes from Prados de la Escosura (2006a) and Prados de la
Escosura and Rosés (2006b).10
offered by Alcaide (1999) that although start in 1964 depart significantly from the rest of
available estimates and are not explained in detail.
The implicit stories in Alcaide’s (1999) and Goerlich and Mas (2001) figures are
rather different. According to Alcaide, a major drop in inequality took place during the
years of the transition to democracy: from a Gini coefficient of 44.6 for 1973/4 to one of
36.3 for 1980/1 (and of 34.7 in 1990/1). Goerlich and Mas offer, in turn, a much lower Gini
(34.0) for 1974 that experienced a moderate decline up to 1991 (with Gini values of 33.3
and 32.0 for 1981 and 1991, respectively). Thus if a significant reduction in the degree of
inequality ever occurred it had to have happened in the late Francoism.
Table 2 compares the evolution of these two sets of Gini estimates for Spain and the
alternativeinequality indices. It turns up that my proposed inequality index (the one that
uses average wage per hour as the denominator) shadows well Goerlich and Mas’s (2001)
Gini estimates while does not match Alcaide’s (1999). As for the pre-1974 period there is
similar evolution between Alcaide’s and my index but only back to 1967. In all the cases,
large discrepancies appear between the trends exhibited by the Gini estimates and
Williamson’s inequality index (the one that uses unskilled wage per hour as denominator).
Thus, the proposed new index seems to be preferable as a crude measure of long run trends
in income inequality.
Graph 5 presents the inequality index and its Hodrick-Prescott trend. Two wide
Kuznets (1955) inverted U with peaks in 1918 and 1953, respectively, preside its evolution.
A long-term rise in the inequality index is observed during the early phase of globalization
that peaked by World War I. It is worth noting that inequality rose between the mid 1860s
and the mid 1880s, fell during the following decade and increased again since the late
1890s up to the end of the Great War. The interwar period presented a sustained reduction
in inequality that was reversed during the Autarchy years and peaked in 1953. A sustained
decline in inequality followed and tended to stabilise since the mid 1970s. Thus, my
inequality index concurs with Goerlich and Mas (2001) in suggesting that a significant drop
in inequality already happened before 1974 while conflicts with Alcaide’s (1999) view of a
dramatic inequality contraction during the early years of transition from dictatorship to
democracy (1974-81).11
It is should be pointed that the inequality trends described here are highly
coincidental with those obtained for non-income indicators. Quiroga and Coll (2000) show
a long term increase in heights inequality among socio-professional groups between the
turn of the century and World War I, a decline up to the eve of the Civil War and a
resumption of raising inequality during the autarchic 1940s.
How can these findings be interpreted? The inequality reduction in the mid 1880s
and early 1890s and the rise from the late 1890s to World War I is what would be predicted
within a Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem framework which posits that protectionism
favors the scarce factors (land and capital, in this case) while penalizes the abundant one
(labor). In Spain the Stolper-Samuelson effect was reinforced at the turn of the nineteenth
century by the fact that tariff protection did not push out workers as in other protectionist
European countries (i.e., Italy and Sweden). The depreciation of the peseta in the 1890s and
early 1900s made more difficult the migration decision as the cost of passage increased
dramatically (Sánchez-Alonso 2000).
Why does this model not explain the rise in inequality between the late 1860s and
the early 1880s period? Perhaps Stolper-Samuelson forces were offset by the intense capital
deepening associated to the railways construction and to the liberalization of mining
resources,and by the dramatic increased in land rents that followed, connected to the
agricultural exporting boom (and exacerbated by the philoxera plague in France that
increased wine imports from Spain). The rise in the ratio of capital compensation per unit
of capital stock to the average wage per worked hour and in the ratio of land compensation
per hectare to average wage per hour worked tend to support this hypothesis (Graph 6)
12.
However, the contrast between the partial closing of the rural-urban and unskilled-
skilled wage gaps (Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso 2004) and the long-term rise in the
inequality index observed between mid nineteenth century and World War I is worth
stressing
13. Such a discrepancy suggests that differential returns between capital and land,
the scarce factors, and labor, the abundant one, rather than wage differentials among
different types of workers, were what really determined the evolution of income inequality
in Spain as measured by my proposed index.
12 Data for these computations comes from Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2006b).12
And what happened in the 1920s and early 1930s? An inequality reduction would
not be consistent, within a Stolper-Samuelson framework, with the conventional view that
depicts the 1920s as years of intense isolation. However, this is no longer the prevailing
view as trade protectionism in the twenties was paralleled by substantial foreign capital
inflows that broke the close link between investment and saving (Prados de la Escosura
2006b). Accelerated growth and structural change, urbanization, and capital deepening all
helped reducing inequality in the 1920s.
The fall in inequality during the early 1930s, a time of globalization backlash in
which increasing restrictions to commodity and factor mobility were introduced are
certainly discrepant with the Stolper-Samuelson view. No doubt, forces pushing for re-
distribution were in place. The drop in capital and land returns relative to labor suggested in
Graph 6 may be the result of a perceived menace to the security of property rights during
the social and political turmoil years prior to the Civil War (1936-39).Meanwhile, nominal
(and real) wages rose in a context of unions’ increasing bargaining power that reflected in
labor unrest
14. It is worth stressing that the Interwar inequality decline is at odds with the
hypothesis of a war of attrition on income and wealth distribution (land, in particular, (Boix
2004)) at the roots of the Spanish Civil War.
Again, the evolution of inequality during the central Autarchy years (1939-53) and
the phase of liberalization and opening up that followed the late fifties’ reforms can be
interpreted in a Stolper-Samuelson framework. Thus, inequality rose during the Autarchy
as scarce factors, land and capital, were favored at the expense of the abundant and more
evenly distributed factor, labor, while opening up to international commodity and factor
market in the sixties and early seventies benefited labor, the abundant factor. However, not
only international economy forces played a role in reducing inequality. Redistribution had a
non negligible part in the late Francoist period (1960-75). Social expenditure had already
started rising in the mid-sixties and its proportion of GDP (excluding education) went up
13 However, according to Betrán and Pons 2004) the skilled/unskilled wage gap rose between the 1880s and
1930 against the view sustained by Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso (2004).
14 Wage data comes from Maluquer de Motes (2005). The increase in the number of days lost due to strikes
rocketed during the II Republic reaching 0.64 percent of the days worked in 1933, slightly above that of the
peak year (1979) during the ‘transition to democracy’, (0.56 percent).Estimates computed with Maluquer de
Motes (2005) figures for days of strike and Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2006b) for total days worked
per year.13
from 5.9 to 12.5 percent in the last decade of Francoism partially catching up to western
Europe’s share (Bandrés 1999).
After democracy was restored in 1977, increasing political participation and
democratization led to a progressive fiscal reform and to substantial increases in public
expenditure on social transfers (unemployment, pensions), education, and health that had a
strongredistributive impact and triggered a further inequality reduction (Gimeno Ullastres
1999). The share of social expenditure in GDP reached 19.6 percent in 1981 and peaked in
1993 (26.7 percent) (Bandrés 1999). Public expenditure on welfare (including education)
almost doubled its share in GDP during the first two decades of democracy. Political
decentralization of spending decisions also had an impact on the inequality decline
(Goerlich and Mas 2004).
Neither a clear association appears to exist, therefore, between falling inequality and
democratization, nor between raising inequality and dictatorship (Graph 7)
15. Inequality
raised during the early Francoist era but declined later, as it was the case under Primo de
Rivera’s autocratic regime (1923-29). All in all, the decline in inequality between the late
1950s and 1974 was larger than the one occurred after democracy was reinstated.
Moreover, no definite trade off between inequality and growth can be established. In the
first hundred years of Spain’s moderneconomic growth, 1850-1950, the most dynamic
periods, 1850-83 and the 1920s, corresponded to phases of increasing and declining
inequality, respectively; while in years of sluggish performance inequality either deepened
(at the turn of the century, in the autarchic period 1939-53) or shrank (during the II
Republic, 1931-36). The unprecedented growth of the ‘Golden Age’ (1951-74) witnessed a
sharp reduction in inequality, while in the decade of ‘transition to democracy’ (1976-85)
inequality fell gradually while per capita income practically stagnated.
Calibrating Long-run Trends in Absolute Poverty
How do the trends presented for inequality and economic growth impinge on
poverty reduction over the last century and a half?
15 The Polity2 index ranges from high autocracy (-10) to high democracy (+10) and it is part of Policy IV
Project Cf. Marshall and Jaggers (2002).14
Poverty reduction depends on the initial level of average income and its subsequent
growth, on the initial income distribution and its evolution over time, and on how sensitive
poverty is to growth and inequality changes (Bourguignon 2002; Ravaillon 2004; López
and Servén 2006). Low initial levels of development preclude a deep impact of growth on
poverty. If a fixed poverty line (PL) is defined and, if due to Spain’s relative affluence a
higher PL is chosen of, say, $4 (expressed in 1985 purchasing power adjusted international
dollars) perperson and day rather than the conventional $1 or $2, it was not until the turn of
the century that average incomes (as measured by per capita GDP) reached the poverty line,
and it did not double it until the early 1960s (Graph 8).
How much impact did growth and distribution changes have on absolute poverty?
We could speculate that during the nineteenth century and up to World War I low per capita
income and growing inequality may have drastically reduced the impact of economic
growth on poverty. High initial inequality would have also mitigated the effect of the
acceleration in economic activity on poverty during the 1920s, as it would have been the
case during the 1953-58 growth recovery. Moreover, falling inequality at a time of faltering
growth (the early 1930s and the ‘transition to democracy’ years, 1976-85) presupposes it
may have had a weak effect on poverty reduction. The unprecedented growth of the 1959-
74 era, and the fast recovery after accession to the European Union suggest, that once the
low initial income constraint has been removed, a the impact on poverty would be
noticeable.
Can these guesses be put to the test? Unfortunately, no microeconomic data on
Spain’s household expenditures are availablebefore the late twentieth century so I had to
rely on the macroeconomic evidence on growth and changes in income distribution
presented in the previous two sections in orderto establish conjectures about historical
trends in absolute poverty that would provide hypotheses for further research.
I have calibrated the impact of growth and inequality changes on absolute poverty
for the case of Spain on the basis of Humberto López and Luis Servén (2006) recent
empirical research that expands previous work by Bourguignon (2002), Ravallion (1997,
2004), and Kraay (2006) and draws on the largest micro database available so far, for a
wide sample of developing and developed countries over the last four decades. Using a
parametric approach López and Servén (2006) find that the observed distribution of income15
is consistent with the hypothesis of lognormality. Under lognormality, the contribution of
growth and inequality changes to poverty reduction only depends on the average
incomes/poverty line ratio and on a measure of inequality (the Gini coefficient). The
poverty headcount, Po,that is, the share of population below the poverty line, is derived as,
Po= Φ(log (z /ν )/σ  + σ /2),
Where σ = √ 2 Φ
-1 ((1 + G)/2)
in whichΦ, is a cumulative normal distribution; ν , the average per capita income; z, the
poverty line; σ , the standard deviation of the distribution; and G, the Gini coefficient.
Thus, all I need to calibrate the poverty headcount is the poverty line/average
income ratio and the Gini coefficient. Unfortunately, as discussed in the previous section
direct Gini estimates are available for the last quarter of twentieth century. Only by splicing
the inequality index with the Gini coefficients for the ‘statistical era’, from 1974 onwards, a
long-run series of Gini can be derived. Thus, in a heuristic exercise, the Gini coefficient
computed by Goerlich and Mas (2001) for 1974 has been projected backwards with the rate
of variation of the inequality index previously smoothed with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
(Graph 9).
No doubt these resulting ‘pseudo-Gini’ indices are questionable. To begin with, the
inequality index is a crude indicator with unknown statistical precision. Besides, by using
changes in the inequality index to project Gini coefficients backwards a new time series is
created in which two different cardinal measures are used: one, the directly estimated Gini,
and another, the backwards projection. These cardinal representations of ordinal inequality
measures might result in large discrepancies. Nonetheless, in favor of the proposed pseudo-
Gini it can be argued that as the inequality index can be interpreted as the ratio between a
quantile of the income distribution (wage per hour) and the mean of the distribution (GDP
per worked hour), backwards projections ofGini directly estimated coefficients may
identify their tendencies correctly although not the amplitude of their swings.The highly
tentative results from this heuristic exercise provide, thus, explicit conjectures on poverty
trends and hopefully offer testable hypotheses for further research.
A long run decline in absolute poverty, only altered by a reversal ‘hump’ in the
autarchy years (1939-58), is the main feature of the evidence presented in Graph 10.
Poverty reduction happened at a different speed: at a slower pace before World War I, that16
supports the view that the impact of growth on poverty is weakened in the presence of
rising inequality and low initial levels of development, and at a faster and accelerating pace
during the twentieth century, especially between 1960 and 1975, once the initial income
constraint was released (Table 3). In phases of sluggish growth, poverty reduction was
taken to a halt (in the 1890s) or reverted (during the autarchy, 1939-58). It is worth pointing
that by the end of Franco’s dictatorship the share of those living below the absolute poverty
defined here was below 2 percent of the population.
A counterintuitive result in the light of conventional historiography that associates
the origins of the Civil War to staggering inequality and extreme poverty is cast by the
calibration: absolute poverty headcount declined from more that half the population in 1920
to one-third of the population by the eve of the Civil War (1935) as a joint outcome of
economic growth and falling inequality.
Which force, economic growth or falling income inequality, does dominate the
long-run reduction of absolute poverty? To provide an answer I have carried out a
counterfactual exercise in which poverty reduction is computed keeping inequality constant
at its highest level, that of 1950. The results for the calibrated and the counterfactual
poverty headcounts are offered in Graph 11 while their respective rates of poverty
reduction are offered in Table 3 (the counterfactual rate is presented under the label of
‘growth effect’). It turns out that economic growth was the main force behind the decline in
absolute poverty observed between 1850 and 1990. Growth prevailed over inequality in the
reduction of poverty during the hundred years between 1850 and1950 except for the
Interwar years. High initial inequality, hence, did not prevent a substantial poverty
contraction in the 1920s that continued during the early 1930s. Between 1925 and 1935
falling inequality is responsible almost exclusively for the contraction in absolute poverty.
Since the 1950s the contribution of declining inequality to reducing poverty rose steadily
and from 1975 onwards prevailed over that of economic growth.
Alas, the controlled conjectures about poverty behavior in the long run cannot be
confronted with hard empirical evidence except for the late twentieth century. The
inequality reduction since the late 1970s was accompanied by an expansion in average
expenditure during the 1980s. As a result, welfare increased, in real terms, between 37 and
51 percent during the years 1973/74-1990/91 (Ruiz-Castillo and Sastre 1999). If a fixed17
relative poverty line of 50 percent of average expenditure in 1973/74 is accepted, a
significant decline in the proportion of the poor took place between 1973 and 1990. In per
capita expenditure terms, the relative poverty headcount fell from 22.2 percent of the
population in 1973/74 to 15.1 percent in 1980/81 and to 5.1 percent in 1990/91 (del Río and
Ruiz-Castillo 1999: 440). Thus, the results derived from the historical calibration of
poverty trends presented here are not rejected by the findings of empirical studies carried
out on the basis of microdata.
Concluding Remarks
Growth and inequality have been assessed over the long-run and an attempt has
been made at calibrating their joint impact on poverty reduction. Inequality rose during the
late nineteenth century and up to World War I, though reversed during the Interwar years.
The autarchy years (1939-58) witnessed a peak in inequality and only as liberalization was
cautiously introduced since the late 1950s inequality fell steadily.
A long run decline is observed in absolute poverty. Growth prevailed over falling
inequality as the main cause of poverty reduction. Absolute poverty fell at a slow pace up
to World War I as a result of the low initial level of development, and much faster from
1960 onwards once the low income constraint had been released. Despite faltering growth
during the II Republic (1931-36) and the ‘transition to democracy’ (1976-85), the
contraction in inequality led to a decline in poverty. Moreover, during 1925-35 and from
1975 onwards falling inequality became the dominant force in the reduction of absolute
poverty.No clear conclusion can be reached, however, about the links between democracy
and inequality decline and poverty reduction, or between growth and inequality.
A research agenda emerges from this survey of the dramatic historical experience of
modern Spain. The fact that the Civil War (1936-39) broke off after one and a half decades
of inequality decline and poverty alleviation demands new explanatory hypotheses that will
require further research and testing. Lagged perceptions of inequality and extreme poverty
might lie at the roots of the civil conflict. Does relative deprivation help to understand the
origins of the Civil War? Dounfulfilled expectations by those at the bottom of the
distribution, who perceived that the share of a growing GDP accruing to them was not large
enough, provide a plausible explanation for the outbreak of the Civil War?18
Moreover, rising polarization is compatible with stable or declining inequality
(Esteban and Ray 1994). Was increasing polarization, rather than inequality and absolute
poverty what triggered social and political conflict in Interwar Spain? Did perhaps the
Great Depression and the social unrest of the early thirties contribute to narrow down
differences both at the top and at the bottom of the income distribution while widening the
gap between them and increasing, therefore, potential conflict?
The dramatic increase in inequality and the sluggish growth during the early
Francoism that resulted in staggering poverty, with two out of five Spaniards below the
poverty line in the mid 1950s, was offset, in turn, by the drastic reduction of income
inequality and absolute povertythat occurred in the late Francoism. Does it help explain the
success of the transition to democracy in the last quarter of the twentieth century?19
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Table 1
Per Capita GDP Growth and its Components 1850-2000
Per Capita GDP/ Employment EAP PAP/
GDP employee /EAP /PAP Population
Panel A. Long-run Trends
1850-2000 1.80 1.73 -0.09 0.09 0.07
1850-1950 0.71 0.65 -0.01 0.08
1950-1974 5.44 5.34 -0.04 0.42 -0.28
1974-2000 2.60 2.58 -0.50 0.17 0.35
Panel B. Long Swings
1850-1883 1.41 1.30 0.09 0.03
1883-1920 0.64 0.69 -0.04 -0.01
1920-1929 2.55 2.44 0.02 0.10
1929-1952 -0.26 -0.48 -0.05 0.27
1952-1958 3.51 2.98 0.04 0.84 -0.35
1958-1974 5.86 5.97 -0.08 0.21 -0.25
1974-1986 1.76 3.95 -1.76 -0.80 0.38
1986-2000 3.31 1.40 0.58 1.00 0.33
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
EAP: Economically Active Population; PAP: Potentially Active Population (15 to 64 years)25
Table 2
Comparing Inequality Trends: Gini Coefficients and the Inequality Index
(1974= 1.00)
Goerlich & Alcaide
Inequality Index
GDP per EAP/ GDP per EAP/
Mas (2001) (1999) average wage unskilled wage
1964 0.94 1.02 1.03
1967 1.04 1.05 1.06
1974 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1981 0.98 0.81 0.96 1.16
1991 0.94 0.78 0.99 1.40
Sources: See the text.26
Table 3
Absolute Poverty Reduction and its Composition: Annual Rate of Variation (%)
Total Growth Effect Growth Contribution
(%)
1850-1920 0.6 0.6 93.0
1920-1935 3.3 1.2 36.5
1950-1960 5.6 3.8 68.9
1960-1975 20.9 12.5 59.7
1975-1990 16.4 7.0 42.7
1850-1950 0.4 0.4 93.5
1950-1990 15.4 8.3 53.7
Sources: See the text.Graph 1. Per Capita GDP and Private Consumption Growth. 1850-2000 (annual average rate %)
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Graph 2. Share of Agriculture in Total Employment
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Graph 3. Relative Labor Productivity in Agriculture [Total Economy = 1]
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Graph 4. Alternative Inequality Indices
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Graph 5. Nominal Inequality Index and its Hodrick-Prescott Trend
[Nominal Inequality Index=GDP per hour worked/ Labor Compensation per hour] (1913=100)
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Graph 6. Nominal Inequality Index and its Components: Hodrick-Prescott Trends
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Graph 7. Democracy and Inequality
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Graph 8. Per Capita GDP/Poverty Line Ratio
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Graph 9. Gini and Pseudo-Gini: Direct Estimates and Conjectures
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Graph 10. Poverty Headcount in Spain (%) [Poverty Line 1985 $ G-K 4 a day per person]
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Graph 11. Actual and Counterfactual Poverty Headcount in Spain (%)
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